04__CLARENS.DOC

10/4/2007 9:53:56 AM

DEFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE ROLE OF THE
EXECUTIVE IN ALIEN TORT STATUTE
LITIGATION
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INTRODUCTION
In the early days of our nation’s history, Chief Justice John
Marshall articulated two principles that form the core of a growing
debate regarding international human rights litigation. The first was
argued before the House of Representatives in 1800.
“The
President,” Marshall said, “is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”1
The second principle came three years later in the Chief Justice’s
infamous Marbury v. Madison opinion. He wrote, “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”2 In a simpler world these ideas regarding the separation of
powers would be mutually exclusive: international diplomacy on the
one hand and domestic jurisprudence on the other. However, in the
real world, the two spheres of government collide, begging the
question: what role is there for the courts in announcing and applying
the law when that law affects the nation’s external relations? Further,
in the realm of international human rights litigation, where cases of
torture scream out for justice, when is it appropriate for the courts to
defer to Executive authority? How much deference should the courts
give when the President, through the Department of State and the
Department of Justice, announces that foreign policy concerns trump
those of the private litigants? Though “it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
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1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing 10 ANNALS
OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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judicial cognizance,”3 a balance must be achieved between the
concerns of the Executive and those of the litigants when those
concerns are properly put before the court.
There are few areas in American jurisprudence where these
issues are clearer than in the Alien Tort Statute (or Alien Tort Claims
Act) (ATS) litigation that has come before the federal courts over the
past twenty-seven years. Interestingly, the Alien Tort Statute was
drafted nearly two hundred years before its recent ascent to the legal
spotlight. The statute was passed with the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350, it states: “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
4
States.” In 1980 the seminal Second Circuit decision in Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala breathed new life into the ATS and initiated a series of
cases in which the lower courts applied Filártiga’s principles to human
rights claims arising under the law of nations (now known as
customary international law).5 These cases were affirmed, though to
what extent is ambiguous, in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision:
6
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Thus, Filártiga represented an important
step in the realm of international human rights litigation. Its progeny
represent an outlet through which plaintiffs, though aliens in this
country, can use the federal judicial system to seek reprieve for
human rights abuses committed against them abroad.
Most recently, a series of cases has been filed in district courts
across the country alleging, inter alia, torture committed against
7
plaintiffs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under Filártiga
and Sosa, it is clear that torture violates customary international law,
and that, as such, torture is actionable under the jurisdiction of the
ATS.8 However, aside from the plaintiffs, defendants, and courts, the
Executive Branch is a vital player in this litigation. The State
Department has become involved in many of these cases, voicing its
statements of interest and suggestions of immunity on behalf of the
Chinese officials.

3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
4. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
5. 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
7. See Jacques DeLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A “Sinical”
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 473, 473–76 (2002); Emma Schwartz, Siding with the Dragon, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006.
8. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-28.
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The question is, therefore, how much deference should the
courts give the Executive Branch in ATS human rights litigation. The
cases involving Chinese officials are particularly important due to the
diplomatic dynamic between the United States and the PRC. The
cases, thus, present an interesting backdrop against which to address
this question. Ultimately, the decision to defer to the Executive
Branch in cases involving torture and other gross violations of human
rights is best made by courts applying a uniform standard. By
analyzing Supreme Court, lower court, and congressional guidance,
and addressing the concerns surrounding too much and too little
executive deference, such a uniform standard that brings balance to
the system is conceivable.
I. ATS HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: FILÁRTIGA TO SOSA
On March 29, 1976, Joelito Filártiga, the son of a Paraguayan
physician Dr. Joel Filártiga, was kidnapped from his house in
Asuncion and tortured to death.9 The kidnapper was the Inspector
General of Police, Americo Peña-Irala, and though it is unclear why
he took the seventeen year old, the kidnapping was alleged an act of
retaliation against the boy’s father.10 Dr. Filártiga was an admitted
opponent of the dictator General Alfredo Stroessner, who had seized
11
power in Paraguay in 1954. Along with having founded and run the
“largest private health clinic for the poor in Paraguay,” Dr. Filártiga
had gained international renown for his artwork, which depicted the
extreme suffering of the Paraguayan people due to the inadequacy of
the government.12 The torture of his son took place at the police
station over the course of one and a half hours. During that time the
13
boy was whipped, slashed, and subjected to electric shocks. Joelito
died of cardiac arrest due to the frequency and intensity of the
shocks.14

9. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
10. See Richard Pierre Claude, The Case of Joelito Filártiga and the Clinic of Hope, 5 HUM.
RTS. Q. 275, 275-301, 283-84 (1983). It is likely Peña hoped to obtain incriminating information
on Dr. Filártiga. Id.
11. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878; Diana Jean Schemo, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, Ruled Paraguay
Through Fear for 35 Years, Dies in Exile at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B7.
12. Claude, supra note 10, at 280-82.
13. Id. at 284.
14. Id.
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The Filártigas’ efforts to find reprieve through the Paraguayan
15
judicial system were met with threats and ultimately denied. As the
Filártigas stated in their complaint against Peña, filed on April 6, 1979
in the Eastern District of New York, “no relief can be obtained [in
Paraguay], as the Paraguayan judiciary is an appendage of the
executive branch.”16 Regardless, public sympathy for the family was
widespread.17 Two thousand people attended the boy’s funeral and
an art exhibit displaying Dr. Filártiga’s work was held at the
Paraguayan-American cultural center. It was sponsored by the U.S.
Embassy and dedicated to Joelito.18
On July 21, 1978, Peña entered the United States on a visitor’s
visa, having been “retired” by Stroessner, who had succumbed to
international pressure after the murder.19 Joelito’s sister Dolly
Filártiga, who was seeking asylum in the United States, became aware
of Peña’s presence in the country and, when he was arrested by the
Immigration and Naturalization Services for overstaying his visa,
promptly had him served with a complaint under the Alien Tort
Statute § 1350.20 On July 30, 1980, the Second Circuit held that
“deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within
our borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.”21
As noted above, § 1350 states, “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
22
The district court in Filártiga found that it lacked
States.”
jurisdiction under § 1350 because it interpreted “‘the law of
nations’ . . . as excluding that law which governs a state’s treatment of
its own citizens.”23 Thus, on appeal, the Second Circuit set out to
review the threshold question of jurisdiction and, specifically, whether

15. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878; Claude, supra note 10, at 285.
16. Complaint at 18, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 97 Civ. 917),
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/filartiga/13june.html.
17. See Claude, supra note 10, at 285-86.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 286.
20. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79; Claude, supra note 10, at 286-87.
21. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
23. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
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the torture of Joelito violated the law of nations.24 To aid in making
its decision, the court requested the opinion of the Executive
25
The memorandum from the Department of State and
Branch.
Department of Justice responding to this request stated two main
points. First, the Alien Tort Statute is not static, but “encompasses
international law as it has evolved over time.”26 As such, “today a
nation has an obligation under international law to respect the right
27
of its citizens to be free of official torture.” Second, it rejects the
idea that “only states, not individuals, could seek to enforce rules of
international law.”28 In this way, in cases such as this one, where there
is a wrong that is “both clearly defined and universally condemned . . .
29
private enforcement is entirely appropriate.”
In its opinion, the court looks at all the implications of finding
that official torture violated the law of nations. The court lists the
various sources of international law, including “works of jurists[,] . . .
30
general usage and practice of nations [and] . . . judicial decisions,”
and acknowledges that international law does evolve over time.31 The
court, though, sets a high standard for determining what qualifies as
the law of nations. It examines the various sources, particularly the
United Nations Charter, U.N. declarations, international treaties and
accords, and national law, and notes not only the widespread
acceptance of torture as a violation of the international law, but also

24. Id.
25. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146, at *1.
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *20.
29. Id. at *23.
30. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 16061).
31. The court cites for both points The Paquete Habana, which states that
Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these,
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.
175 U.S. 677 at 700 (1900) (quoted in Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81). The Paquete Habana
involved the seizure of a Spanish fishing vessel during the Spanish-American War. The Court
held that the proscription of such seizures had, over time, become international law “by the
general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or
other public act.” Id.
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the lack of dissent against that general view.32 It concludes that “[t]he
prohibition [of official torture] is clear and unambiguous, and admits
33
no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens.” Of further
importance, the court makes clear that the international law is part of
the federal common law. It acknowledges that historically, “[d]uring
the eighteenth century, it was taken for granted . . . that the law of
nations forms a part of the common law,”34 and cites The Paquete
35
Habana, stating that “international law is part of our law.” This
historical analysis was crucial to validating the Alien Tort Statute
under Article III of the Constitution, which grants federal courts the
power to hear cases “arising under . . . the laws of the United States.”
These laws include both statute and federal common law.36
Filártiga was a watershed for international human rights
adjudication in the federal courts. A few cases decided between
Filártiga and Sosa are illustrative. Amongst these were a series of
cases, consolidated in In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation (Marcos I), filed in the late 1980s and early 1990s
against former Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter
37
Imee Marcos-Manotoc for torture and wrongful death. As these
cases were the first time the Executive Branch had announced its
position in an ATS case since Filártiga, the court addressed
Executive’s position directly. The court recognized the flip in the
opinion of the Department of Justice between its expansive reading
of the Alien Tort Statute in Filártiga and its far more narrow reading
in its Marcos I amicus brief, and found that the Executive Branch’s
“change of position in different cases and by different administrations
is not a definitive statement by which [the courts] are bound on the
limits of § 1350.”38 The court proceeds to find that torture, a violation

32. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84.
33. Id. at 884.
34. Id. at 886.
35. Id. at 887 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
36. Id. at 886 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
37. The procedural history of the Marcos litigation is explained in In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Marcos II), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
various lawsuits were filed in 1986, shortly after Marcos and his supporters fled to Hawaii, that
though the district courts dismissed the actions based on the “act of state” doctrine, they were
remanded and later consolidated and certified as a class action, and finally that in one of these
consolidated cases, motions based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and ATS
that challenged a default judgment against Marcos-Manotoc were denied in 1992).
38. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Marcos I), 978 F.2d 493,
500 (9th Cir. 1992).
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of jus cogens,39 does invoke subject-matter jurisdiction under the
40
ATS. In a later appeal of the consolidated cases, the Ninth Circuit
reiterated that “[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of
a norm that is specific, universal and obligatory,” and that torture
41
satisfies this standard.
In Kadić v. Karadžić, a suit alleging various atrocities including
genocide, torture, and summary execution, the Second Circuit’s
finding of jurisdiction under the ATS was supported, as in Filártiga,
42
by the Executive Branch. The defendant Karadžić was the leader of
“Srpska,” a self-proclaimed, though unrecognized, republic within the
territory of Bosnia, after the break up of Yugoslavia. In its opinion,
the court states that “[t]he Executive Branch has emphatically
restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war
crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law.”43 It
also recognizes that, per the Executive Branch’s statements, there is
no conflict with the political branches in adjudicating the plaintiff’s
claims in this case.44 Quoting the Government’s Statement of
Interest, the court acknowledges that though ATS claims may invoke
political questions that would preclude their justiciability, this claim
does not.45 However, the court also points out that “even an assertion
of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to
respectful consideration, would not necessarily preclude
adjudication.”46
The Supreme Court finally addressed the Alien Tort Statute in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.47 The story of Alvarez-Machain began in
Mexico in 1985 with the torture and murder of Enrique Camarena-

39. Jus cogens is “[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted
and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
40. Marcos I, 978 F.2d at 503 (The plaintiff’s “suit as an alien against Marcos-Manotoc for
having caused the wrongful death of her son, by official torture in violation of a jus cogens norm
of international law, properly invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under
§ 1350.”).
41. Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1475.
42. 70 F.3d 232, 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 239-40.
44. See id. at 250.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
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Salazar, an agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).48 The
DEA claimed that Alvarez-Machain, a doctor in Mexico, prolonged
the agent’s life so that his abductors could interrogate and torture
him.49 After negotiations with Mexican officials failed to produce
Alvarez-Machain for trial in the United States, the DEA offered
50
payment for the doctor’s kidnapping. He was, thereafter, abducted
by Jose Francisco Sosa, among others, in Guadalajara, taken to a
motel, held overnight, and finally handed to federal agents in El Paso,
Texas.51 Alvarez-Machain initially challenged his arrest claiming both
outrageous government conduct and lack of jurisdiction because the
52
government violated the extradition treaty with Mexico. In United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court found against AlvarezMachain on both issues;53 however, upon proceeding to trial in 1992,
54
the doctor was ultimately acquitted.
In 1993, Alvarez-Machain began an action under the Alien Tort
Statute, claiming arbitrary detention in violation of the law of nations.
The Court granted certiorari and in 2004 issued its decision finding
that § 1350 was a jurisdictional statute that in itself granted no cause
55
of action. However, the Court made clear that the statute’s passage
and legislative history imply that it was intended to have some
practical effect; namely, it provides jurisdiction over certain
recognizable, though limited, common law principles that arise out of
customary international law.56 The Court notes three violations of the
law of nations at the time the ATS was drafted that set the standard
for recognizable violations of customary international law today:
48. Id.; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
49. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697; Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657.
50. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 n.2.
51. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 712.
56. Id. at 724-25. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, too, argues that because the ATS is
purely jurisdictional and because there is no exception here to Erie’s “fundamental holding that
a general common law does not exist,” an act of Congress is necessary to create a cause of action
in cases invoking the jurisdiction of the ATS. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original). Thus, by inviting the courts to use their discretion, though with appropriate restraint,
Justice Scalia admonishes Justice Souter’s majority opinion, stating:
In today’s latest victory for its Never Say Never Jurisprudence, the Court ignores its
own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags its finger at the lower
courts for going too far, and then—repeating the same formula the ambitious lower
courts themselves used—invites them to try again.
Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy.57
Though adamant in its opinion that courts apply a high degree of
judicial caution in recognizing international norms as enforceable
international law under § 1350, the Court does affirm the reasoning in
Filártiga, finding that torture is a violation of an “international law
norm with [as] definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations [as] the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
58
enacted.”
With regard to Alvarez-Machain’s claims, the Court ultimately
found that detention for such a short period of time did not meet
59
these strict requirements. This decision, regardless, flew in the face
of the Executive Branch’s insistence that the Alien Tort Statute
requires a separate act of Congress to establish a cause of action
under which it can be invoked.60 The Justice Department had clearly
stated regarding this litigation: “Just as Section 1350 does not itself
create a cause of action, a cause of action is not supplied by the
instruments of international law relied on by the Ninth Circuit or,
more generally, by some sort of federal-common-law theory.”61 The
Court, though, far from rejects the importance of deference in
handling cases that touch on foreign relations. Citing In re South
African Apartheid Litigation,62 a case that South Africa claimed, and
the United States Department of State agreed, would “interfere with
63
the policy embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission,”
the Court notes that “there is a strong argument that federal courts
should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the
case’s impact on foreign policy.”64

57. Id. at 720.
58. See id. at 732.
59. Id. at 738.
60. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/
3mer/2mer/2003-0339.mer.aa.html.
61. Id. at 24; see Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/doj050803.pdf (“The ATS, which is a simple grant of
jurisdiction, cannot properly be construed as a broad grant of authority for courts to decipher
and enforce their own concepts of international law.”).
62. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
63. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to deal with the injustice that
occurred under apartheid in South Africa. Information on the Committee is available at The
Official Truth and Reconciliation Commission Website, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/ (last visited
March 30, 2007).
64. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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II. EXECUTIVE DEFERENCE IN RELATION TO FOREIGN
RELATIONS: ALTMANN AND BEYOND
A few weeks before issuing its Sosa decision, the Supreme Court
issued a decision in a case arising under a different, yet closely
related, statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Republic of Austria v. Altmann involved a claim by Maria Altmann,
the niece and sole surviving heir of Jewish Czechoslovakian art
collector Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, for six Gustav Klimt paintings that
had been seized by the Nazis in World War II and that had ended up
65
in a museum in Austria. Altmann claimed jurisdiction in the federal
courts under the FSIA; however, the FSIA was not passed until 1978,
66
The Court granted certiorari to
years after the alleged wrong.
address the question of whether or not the FSIA applied
retroactively.67
The FSIA “grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction
of federal and state courts but expressly exempts certain cases,”
including expropriation cases.68 A codification of a restrictive theory
of immunity, the Act gives the courts “primary responsibility” in
determining whether to grant immunity.69 In Altmann, the Court held
that the FSIA does apply to pre-enactment conduct.
The Court also makes an important comment with respect to
executive deference. Though the Executive Branch had contended
that the FSIA does not apply to pre-enactment conduct, the Court
finds that this was “a ‘pure question of statutory construction . . . well
70
within the province of the Judiciary.’” However, the Court clarifies
that “should the State Department choose to express its opinion on
the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners
in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be
entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on
a particular question of foreign policy.”71
Upon post-Altmann remand, in Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH
& Co KG, the Second Circuit expanded on these Supreme Court
statements regarding deference in the immunity context.72 Looking at
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

541 U.S. 677, 680-84 (2004).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 701 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 448 (1987)).
Id. at 702 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
431 F.3d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 2005).
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a class action suit against Austria, arising “from sweeping
confiscations of property that were part of the systematic Nazi
victimization of Austrian Jews between 1938 and 1945,” the court
sought to answer the question of how much deference should be
73
In dismissing the case as nongiven the Executive Branch.
justiciable under the political question standards of Baker v. Carr,74
the court notes three reasons for affording deference on this
“particular” question:
(1) the Executive Branch has exercised its authority to enter into
executive agreements respecting the resolution of the claims in
question; (2) the United States Government (a) has established
through an executive agreement an alternative international forum
for considering the claims in question, and (b) has indicated to this
Court that, as a matter of foreign policy, the alternative forum is
superior to litigation; and (3) the United States foreign policy
advanced by the executive agreement is substantially undermined
75
by the continuing pendency of this case.

It clearly notes, though, the narrowness of its holding given the
interests of the Executive and the facts of the case and cites Sosa for
76
the importance of case-specific deference.
The Eleventh Circuit, also had occasion to address deference
with regard to claims arising out of the Nazi policy of expropriating
Jewish property. In Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, the court
looked at the question of justiciability in cases affecting foreign policy
and found that, “although the executive’s statement of interest is
entitled to deference, it does not make the litigation non77
It ultimately did find, however, that deference is
justiciable.”
appropriate when analyzing whether the case should be dismissed due
73. Id.
74. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Baker court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question..
Id. In Whiteman, the court finds the case nonjusticiable under the fourth standard, “the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government.” Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 72.
75. Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 74.
76. Id.
77. 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004).
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to international comity considerations.78 Because of the government’s
agreement with Germany and establishment of a foundation to
handle claims such as the plaintiff’s, the court found that “based on
the strength of our government’s interests in using the Foundation,
the strength of the German government’s interests, and the adequacy
of the Foundation as an alternative forum,” it was appropriate for it
to abstain from adjudicating the case.79
Finally, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC., an ATS case involving war
crimes, environmental devastation, racial discrimination, and
violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) related to mining operations that led to a ten year civil
war in Papua New Guinea, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question
of Executive deference in the context of the political question
doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and international comity.80 It held
that despite the Executive’s Statement of Interest (SOI) seeking
dismissal of the case, the district court erred in finding the claims nonjusticiable.81
Looking first at the political question doctrine, it found that “it is
[the court’s] responsibility to determine whether a political question
is present, rather than to dismiss on that ground simply because the
Executive Branch expresses some hesitancy about a case
82
proceeding.” The court’s opinion looks closely at the six Baker
83
factors. It determines that because, absent the State Department’s
Statement of Interest, this case would not evoke political question
concerns, “the SOI must carry the primary burden of establishing a
political question.”84 It thus concludes that despite the SOI, there is
no political question due to three considerations:
[1] The State Department explicitly did not request that [the court]
dismiss this suit on political question grounds, and [the court is]
confident that proceeding does not express any disrespect for the
executive, even if it would prefer that the suit disappear. [2] Nor

78. Id. at 1238-39.
79. Id. at 1239.
80. 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). On April 12, 2007 the 9th Circuit granted Rio
Tinto’s petition for rehearing en banc withdrawing this opinion, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 0256256, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8387, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2007), and re-issuing this opinion,
unchanged, as an en banc opinion, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 02-56256, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
8430, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2007).
81. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1074.
82. Id. at 1081.
83. See supra note 74 (listing the six factors).
84. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1082.
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do[es] [the court] see any “unusual need for unquestioning
adherence” to the SOI’s nonspecific invocations of risks to the
peace process. [3] And finally, given the guarded nature of the SOI,
[the court] see[s] no “embarrassment” that would follow from
fulfilling [the court’s] independent duty to determine whether the
85
case should proceed.

The court also notes the possibility, argued by plaintiffs, of a political
shift in Papau New Guinea that would undercut the four-year-old
86
letter from the State Department.
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the role of Executive
87
deference with regard to the act of state doctrine. Addressing first
the racial discrimination claim, the court found that this is a violation
of jus cogens and, therefore, not an official sovereign act.88 As the act
of state doctrine requires an official sovereign act, the court
concluded that the claim cannot be barred by it. With regard to the
claims arising under the UNCLOS, the court found that its discussion
of the SOI in the political question context is relevant, though not
dispositive, to the act of state analysis. The court stated, “A
consideration of foreign policy concerns is one of several Sabbatino
factors, and the SOI’s foreign policy concerns are entitled to
consideration, but only as one part of that analysis.”89 The court then
vacated the district court’s decision, remanding for further

85. Id. (citing the fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors, supra note 74). The court also notes
that this conclusion is consistent with its holding in Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th
Cir. 2005), which dismissed ATS claims under the political question doctrine. The court stated:
“We do not understand Vatican Bank as foreclosing the plaintiffs’ claims that relate to the PNG
regime’s alleged war crimes, but instead read its holding to apply only to the narrower category
of war crimes committed by enemies of the United States.” Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1084. The Ninth
Circuit, thus, avoids a circuit split with the Second Circuit’s decision in Kadić. Id.
86. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1083 n.13.
87. The act of state doctrine of justiciability “prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.”
Id. at 1084 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)). The act of
state doctrine is invoked whenever a court’s decision would invalidate an official act taken by a
foreign state. Id. (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404
(1990)).
88. Id. at 1085.
89. Id. at 1086. The Sabbatino factors noted by the Supreme Court are:
[1] [T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area
of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it . . . . [2] [T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign
relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.[3] The
balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which
perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence.
Id. at 1084 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
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consideration given its SOI analysis.90 Finally, the court conducted a
similar analysis under the comity doctrine, again sending the case
back to the district court for consideration consistent with its political
question SOI discussion.91
As these cases illustrate, what amounts to giving “serious weight”
to the Executive’s “considered judgments” in private actions against
foreign parties is far from clear. If the Executive makes a statement
alleging the “particular” foreign policy implications of a “particular”
judgment involving the “particular” parties in a case, does “serious
weight” require instant dismissal of the case? How “particular” must
the Executive be? How much latitude does “serious weight” afford
the courts? Further, the courts’ opinions above have applied
executive deference to justiciability doctrines such as political
question, act of state, and international comity. What is the
relationship between deference and these doctrines in ATS human
rights litigation?
III. THE ATS AND CLAIMS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA
The cases arising out of human rights abuses in China reflect the
importance of answering these questions. The Southern District of
New York, the Seventh Circuit, and the Northern District of
California have all ruled on ATS actions involving Chinese officials.
The Southern District of New York and Seventh Circuit, however,
did not reach the merits. In Zhou v. Peng, an ATS claim was brought
against Li Peng, the Premier of China at the time of the human rights
abuses that stemmed from the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing
in 1989.92 Though initially finding that process had been properly
served on Peng through the State Department security detail
protecting him, the Southern District vacated that judgment on
August 30, 2003, upon receiving a motion by the Government to
vacate on the grounds that the order effectuating service of process
on Peng required that the State Department official deliver the
papers to Peng.93 Thus the order violates the U.S. Government’s

90. Id. at 1086.
91. Id. at 1088. International comity, the court explains, suggests that courts “defer to the
laws or interests of a foreign country and decline to exercise jurisdiction that is otherwise
properly asserted.” Id. at 1086.
92. 286 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
93. See id.

04__CLARENS.DOC

2007]

10/4/2007 9:53:56 AM

DEFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

429

sovereign immunity by requiring the federal official to act.94 In Ye v.
Zemin, the Seventh Circuit found that a suit by Falun Gong adherents
against former People’s Republic of China president Jiang Zemin was
barred by head of state immunity.95 Heads of state, the court held,
were not covered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and,
therefore, determination of head of state immunity still belonged to
the Executive Branch.96 Unquestionable deference was required. 97
The widespread persecution of the Falun Gong, a massive
Chinese spiritual movement, began on July 22, 1999 when it was
officially outlawed as an “evil cult” by the Chinese government under
President Zemin. Due to the size of the movement, it has been
perceived by the government as a threat to the Communist Party’s
control.98 On July 21, 2005, Gretchen Birkle, Acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary at the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor at the U.S. State Department, noted that since 1999 more than
100,000 Falun Gong adherents and sympathizers have been
detained.99 Amnesty International reports that “[m]ost of those
detained were assigned to periods of ‘Re-education through Labour’
without charge or trial, during which they were at high risk of torture
or ill-treatment, particularly if they refused to renounce their
beliefs.”100 The State Department’s 2005 Country Report on Human
Rights Practices stated that “[s]ince the crackdown on Falun Gong
began in 1999, estimates of Falun Gong adherents who died in

94. Id.
95. 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 625.
97. See id. at 626 (“The obligation of the Judicial Branch is clear—a determination by the
Executive Branch that a foreign head of state is immune from suit is conclusive and a court must
accept such a determination without reference to the underlying claims of a plaintiff.”).
98. Mark J. Leavy, Note, Discrediting Human Rights Abuse as an “Act of State”: A Case
Study on the Repression of the Falun Gong in China and Commentary on International Human
Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 749, 757 (2004); see Falun Gong and China’s
Continuing War on Human Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human
Rights and Int’l Operations and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the H. Comm.
on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 13 (2005) (statement of Gretchen Birkle, Acting Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S.
Department of State) (“[The Chinese Communist Party leaders] proclaim stability and social
order as a top priority, often at the expense of basic human rights and freedom, as a means to
perpetuate
the
rule
of
the
Chinese
Communist
Party.”),
available
at
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/22579.pdf.
99. Birkle, supra note 98, at 14.
100. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2005: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/chnsummary-eng.
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custody due to torture, abuse, and neglect ranged from several
101
hundred to a few thousand.”
On December 8, 2004, in the case Doe v. Liu Qi, the Northern
District of California granted default declaratory judgment in favor of
102
the Falun Gong plaintiffs. Though this has been seen by supporters
of the Falun Gong ATS cases as a hopeful precedent,103 the Northern
District of California proceeded cautiously in its Liu decision denying
104
both injunctive and monetary relief. Ultimately it found that the act
of state doctrine, due primarily to the State Department’s concerns
voiced in its Statement of Interest, precludes granting any relief
except declaratory relief for the plaintiffs’ specific substantive claims
and deemed adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims regarding the general
105
conduct of the Chinese government inappropriate.
Currently, another Falun Gong case is pending in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Li v. Bo presents allegations very
similar to those in Liu, including torture, genocide, deprivation of the
right to life, arbitrary detention, and deprivation of freedom of
106
religion. The notable difference between the cases is the reason for
each defendant’s presence in the United States, which enabled them
to be served. Bo Xilia, former Governor of the Liao Ning Province
and current Minister of Commerce of the PRC, was served on April
22, 2004 while on special diplomatic mission “pursuant to an
invitation of the Executive Branch to participate in an annual meeting
of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.”107
Consequently, it is because of the official nature of Bo’s presence in
the United States that the Executive Branch has urged the D.C.
District Court to dismiss the claims.108 Plaintiffs, however, insist this
case is justiciable for three reasons. First, Bo Xilai is not subject to
any cognizable immunity. Second, neither sovereign immunity nor
act of state bars this action because torture and genocide can never be

101. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61605.htm.
102. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 2004). On December 8, 2004, the Honorable
Judge Wilken adopted the October 28, 2004 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Chen.
103. See Schwartz, supra note 7.
104. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
105. See id.
106. See Class Action Complaint at 16-23, Li v. Bo, No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. June 30, 2004).
107. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Li v. Bo,
No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. July 24, 2006).
108. Id. at 1.
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legally justified actions of a state. Third, foreign policy considerations
do not apply as there is a clear legal standard that the court can
109
apply.
IV. DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:
ESTABLISHING A PRACTICAL STANDARD
Li v. Bo illustrates the complexity of the question of judicial
involvement in litigation, particularly Alien Tort Statute litigation,
affecting foreign governments. It has been argued that the courts
have no place in international human rights litigation. Surely, though,
various factors place this type of litigation within the competency of
the courts, and further, the courts have made it clear that they are not
about to defer without good reason. The doctrines of justiciability
including immunity, act of state, political question, and international
comity foreclose the adjudication of many claims. Further, post-Sosa,
the courts have mandated a very narrow scope of discretion for
110
themselves in identifying causes of action under the ATS. On the
other hand, in 1992 Congress, instead of muting the influence of the
ATS, affirmed its importance, particularly with regard to torture and
extrajudicial killing, through the Torture Victims Protection Act.111
Ultimately, the limited scope of human rights litigation with its welldefined doctrines of justiciability, its Supreme Court guidance, and its
Congressional approval argue for, rather than against, its
adjudication. Regardless, in many situations deference to the
Executive as “the sole organ of the nation” is advisable and, indeed,
necessary. The challenge for the courts is in deciding when to defer.
In light of the cases above, the compelling nature of the human rights
claims, the interest of the Executive Branch, and need for uniformity,
deference must be based on a legally cognizable principle: namely,
the specific and foreseeable costs of the litigation to the Executive’s
administration of foreign policy. The benefits of such a standard are
far-reaching. First, it is practical and consistent with the mandates of
the Supreme Court and Congress. It also explains many of the lower
court decisions and brings uniformity to their reasoning. Second, it
addresses many of the concerns on both sides on the deference
109. See Response to the Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United
States, Li v. Bo, No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2006).
110. The question of what causes of action are recognizable under Sosa is outside the scope
of this Note. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that torture and other
such gross violations of human rights pass the Sosa test.
111. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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debate: it minimizes many of the inherent costs of international
human rights litigation, it balances the rights of individual plaintiffs
with the compelling concerns of the Executive Branch, and finally, it
maintains the independence of the judicial system.
A. Examining a Test for Deference: A Practical Standard
Comparing the Statements of Interest in the Liu and Bo cases
best illustrates the application of a test focusing on specific and
foreseeable costs of litigation to the Executive’s administration of
foreign affairs. In Li v. Bo, the Department of State urged the D.C.
District Court to dismiss the case on the grounds that Minister Bo had
been invited by the Executive to Washington and that it was pursuant
to that invitation that he was in the United States and able to be
served. The Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the
United States notes the possible ramifications of allowing this case to
proceed, such as the negative effects this may have on future
invitations extended to foreign, particularly Chinese, officials. It
states,
The prospect that senior foreign officials who are in the United
States for government-to-government business may be served with
process in a civil suit poses a severe impediment to the conduct of
foreign relations. Its effect is to deprive the President of an
essential foreign policy tool—the ability to host meetings without
112
fear of harassment or, ultimately, to host meetings at all.

This is a specific and foreseeable cost to the Executive’s
administration of foreign affairs.
Conversely, in Doe v. Liu, the State Department focuses on the
act of state doctrine and vague references to possible impacts the
113
litigation can have on U.S. relations with China. In urging the court
to find the case non-justiciable, the State Department cites “the
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences that such
litigation can generate.”114 There are no foreseeable costs that the
115
Executive pointed to with any specificity. Further, both reasons the
State Department gives for dismissing the action, foreign sovereign
112. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Intent of the United States, supra note 107,
at 13.
113. Statement of Interest of the United States, Doe v. Liu, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. 02 Civ. 672) (attaching letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department
of State, to Honorable Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice (Sept. 25, 2002)).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See generally id.
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immunity and the act of state doctrine, have been repudiated by
116
Thus, the
subsequent litigation as possible means for dismissal.
Executive has given no reason to abstain from adjudicating the case.
Ultimately it is likely that this standard will lead to the dismissal
of cases via the political question or international comity doctrines.
Once a cognizable cost to the Executive has been identified, the
continued litigation of a particular case would likely fall within the
fourth, fifth, or sixth Baker standard of non-justiciability: namely, “[4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
117
departments on one question.” For instance in Li v. Bo, there is a
clear lack of respect for the President’s decision to invite certain
ministers if those ministers are subject to being served with a civil suit
upon entering the country.118 Likewise, in the case of In re: South
African Apartheid Litigation, comity concerns regarding the
usurpation of South Africa’s efforts to deal with its troubled past
illustrate a specific and foreseeable cost to adjudicating those
claims.119 The specific and foreseeable conflict with the Truth and
Rehabilitation program mandates deference to the Executive’s call
for an end to the litigation. Naturally a handful of cases may arise
where the Executive announces a specific and foreseeable cost and
yet that consideration does not place the case squarely in either of
these doctrines. In such cases, separation of powers is sufficient
grounds for dismissal. It would simply be improper to proceed with
such a case.
This standard is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Sosa and Altmann. It asks the courts to look, on a case-

116. As explained in Part II of this Note, the Ninth Circuit held in Sarei that the
adjudication of violations of jus cogens do not fall into the province of the act of state doctrine,
thus, given the district court’s opinion in Liu, the case will possibly be reversed given the new
precedent. Interestingly, in its Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest in the Bo
Xilai litigation, the State Department urges the Court not to undertake a sovereign immunity or
act of state analysis, as both doctrines require official actions and the State Department would
like to avoid implicating the PRC in egregious official action.
117. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 216, 217 (1962).
118. See Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Intent of the United States, supra note
107, at 4-11.
119. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 733 n.21 (2004).
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by-case basis, at the particular concerns of the Executive.120 It also
limits the issues on which the courts would defer, maintaining the
ability to interpret statutes and adjudicate private claims in the
judiciary, while deferring to the Executive’s knowledge on what the
ramifications of litigation may be.
With regard to the allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing,
striking this balance is also consistent with the will of the Congress.
In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victims Protection Act
121
(TVPA). The purpose of the act was “to provide a Federal cause of
action against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority,
or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects any individual to
In this way, Congress has
torture or extrajudicial killing.”122
sanctioned this type of litigation. Universal deference would,
therefore, be inappropriate. As Justice Jackson noted in the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, “When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter.”123 The President’s constitutional
powers in the realm of foreign relations are great and, with good
reason, can trump the other branches, but it is unquestionable that
Congress, through statute, can create causes of action enforceable in
federal courts.
Further, the courts have, in effect, been using this standard in the
cases preceding Sosa and Altmann. In Whiteman and UngaroBenages the courts were ultimately looking at the specificity and
124
foreseeability of the Executive’s concerns. In both cases, the claims
were dismissed because of the specific and foreseeable cost to the
Executive’s administration of Nazi expropriation claims.
Accordingly, in Sarei, the Ninth Circuit viewed the Statement of
Interest’s “nonspecific invocations of risks to the peace process,” as
not sufficient to require the court’s deference.125

120. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) (stating that deference
should be given to “the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of
foreign policy”).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 84.
123. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
124. See Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co KG, 431 F.3d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2005); see
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004).
125. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC., 456 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).
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B. Addressing the Concerns in the Deference Debate
Human rights litigation under the ATS has spurred strong
sentiments from both its advocates and its critics. A quick search on
LexisNexis or Westlaw reveals hundreds of articles published since
the Second Circuit’s decision in Filártiga either condemning the
litigation as an unconstitutional or inappropriate use of judicial
power, or praising it as “rais[ing] the voices of the oppressed, and at
the same time . . . remind[ing] those responsible for carrying out
126
human rights abuses that they no longer operate with impunity.”
Consequently, scholars in the field have voiced various concerns with
both adjudicating these cases and abstaining from such adjudication.
By establishing a cognizable test focusing on the specific and
foreseeable costs of litigation, many of these concerns are, if not
negated, diminished: “Gratuitous tensions with other nations should
certainly be avoided[, b]ut sometimes tensions are not gratuitous[.]”127
1. Minimizing the Inherent Costs of International Human Rights
Litigation. In an article published in the Chicago Journal of
International Law in 2001, Professor Curtis Bradley outlined three
major costs associated with international human rights litigation: costs
to foreign relations, costs to democracy, and costs to the international
128
As Bradley notes, however, “these costs would not be
system.
worthy of serious concern if we could be assured that this litigation
129
would be contained within narrow bounds.” By defining a legally
cognizable test to determine when a court should defer to the
Executive in human rights cases, such a limitation would be assured.
Further, the test focuses on addressing the specific and foreseeable
costs of litigation, thus by its nature minimizing those very costs.
For instance, Bradley notes the costs to the international system
of allowing service of process to be effected on those traveling to the
130
U.N. headquarters in New York. Clearly, as in the case of Li v. Bo,
there is a specific and foreseeable cost to allowing such litigation to
126. Mark Gibney, U.S. Courts and the Selective Protection of Human Rights, in JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 177, 179 (Mark Gibney & Stanislaw
Frankowski eds., 1999).
127. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law 11 (Univ. of
Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 128, 2006), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/128.pdf.
128. Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 457, 460 (2001).
129. Id. at 470.
130. Id. at 469-70.
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proceed. Thus, should the Executive Branch raise that issue, the
court would find just cause to defer to its judgment.
This raises another concern relating to the costs of ATS litigation
to foreign relations: namely the burden on the Executive of having to
“stake[] out positions that it might wish to leave ambiguous or
131
unarticulated.” Without succumbing to universal deference, setting
narrow and transparent criteria for deference would set clear
guidelines on what the Executive would need to assert to convince a
court. This minimizes the Executive’s burden in two ways. First, if
there is no specific and foreseeable reason for the court to defer, the
Executive Branch is not in a position where it has to articulate its
general position on a matter in effort to convince a judge. Second,
this transparency would extend to foreign governments observing this
process, thereby making it less awkward for the Executive Branch.
2. Balancing the Rights of Individual Plaintiffs with the
Compelling Concerns of the Executive Branch. It has been argued
that the cases alleging human rights violations in China “interfere
with . . . political balancing” of U.S.-China relations, particularly
balancing of economic matters with the United States’ disapproval of
China’s human rights record.132 Though this concern carries great
weight, particularly in light of Chinese complaints that this litigation
133
“adversely affect[s]” U.S.-China relations, it must be remembered
that “[o]fficial China is not so uncomprehending of the United States
134
system of separation of powers as it claims to be.” Understanding
these two points illustrates how a uniform and transparent standard
will satisfy many concerns regarding fears of the judiciary stepping on
the Executive’s toes. More deference would only serve to deny
individuals the right to appeal to the judicial system for relief under
the laws of the United States.135 Vague concern that these cases will
actually affect U.S.-China relationships is not sufficient to usurp
judicial power. On the other hand, specific and foreseeable costs such
as a threat to our ability to host meetings of Chinese officials without
embarrassing harassment would be sufficient to require respectful
deference. Further, plaintiffs would be aware that serving an official
here on a diplomatic mission would only lead to dismissal, thus, it
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

DeLisle, supra note 7, at 488.
Bradley, supra note 128, at 461.
Schwartz, supra note 7.
DeLisle, supra note 7, at 491-92.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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would make it less likely they would attempt to serve such ministers
again.
In Filártiga, the court concluded its opinion stating, “In the
modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have
combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect
for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective
interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations . . . is
136
the right to be free of physical torture.” As Congress understood,
“[t]hese universal principals provide scant comfort, however, to the
many thousands of victims of torture and summary executions around
the world.”137 The ATS and TVPA allow victims of some of the most
heinous crimes to seek relief when, in most cases, none is available
elsewhere. Though it is argued that no real relief can be granted to
these victims by the courts because of the difficulty in enforcing and
collecting monetary damages in ATS litigation,138 plaintiffs in these
suits beg to differ. After the Second Circuit’s decision in Kadić, for
instance, one of the plaintiffs noted that the case “was not about
monetary damages, but about gaining recognition of the acts
139
committed by Bosnian Serb ultra-nationalists.”
Despite the noble cause of adjudicating torture and other gross
violations of human rights, there are times such adjudication imposes
real costs on the Executive’s exercise of foreign relations. It was for
this reason that the Altmann Court mandated “deference [to] the
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of
140
foreign policy.” By requiring a specific and foreseeable cost to the
Executive, the rule for deference would ensure a plaintiff’s day in
court while ensuring the Executive’s ability to protect real interests of
the nation with regard to foreign relations.
3. Maintaining the Independence of the Judicial System. Finally,
establishing a practical standard for executive deference ensures a
higher level of judicial independence. Surely, the defense of human
rights is a political issue. Different administrations have given human
rights varying degrees of priority. When Filártiga was being decided,
President Jimmy Carter had made human rights his utmost priority.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 867, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, supra note 122, at 3.
Bradley, supra note 128, at 458-59.
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 546 (4th ed. 2006).
140. Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004).
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In December 1978, he said, “Human rights is the soul of our foreign
policy. And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the
141
soul of our sense of nationhood.” Alternatively, President Bush has
focused his foreign policy on national security and fighting the war on
terror. As noted above, amongst the costs of human rights litigation
is the cost to democracy. For better or worse, the course of our
current foreign policy was decided by an election. Thus, ATS
142
litigation can be seen as amounting to “plaintiffs’ diplomacy,” and
thereby usurping the democratic process.
At the same time, however, it runs contrary to the separation of
powers to therefore assert that the Executive should have the ability
to determine what cases the courts can and cannot adjudicate. As
Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, “I would be uncomfortable with a
doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive’s
permission before invoking its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the
name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict
143
with that very doctrine.”
In her 2004 article published in the Harvard Human Rights
Journal, Professor Beth Stephens questions the motivations behind
the Bush Administration’s involvement in recent ATS litigation and
recommends caution in deferring to its foreign policy concerns.144 She
notes that her position “is not to suggest that the courts second-guess
the wisdom of a particular foreign policy, a task clearly assigned to
the executive branch. But the courts should review the evidence as to
the substance of that policy and assess whether the evidence . . .
supports the results it requests.” 145
Again, a legal standard based on the specificity and foreseeability
of the cost to the Executive’s administration of foreign policy

141. Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, The U.S. Commitment: Human Rights and Foreign
Policy (Dec. 1978), excerpts available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/hrintro/carter.htm.
142. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241,
2243 (2004) (“The broadest critiques of the ATS have been that the private litigation of human
rights violations complicates the war on terrorism, that it amounts to ‘plaintiffs’ diplomacy’ by
interfering with executive branch prerogatives in foreign affairs.”).
143. 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
144. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 182 (2004) (arguing that the Bush
Administration’s legal stance on recent ATS litigation “mask an interest in shielding favored
defendants from accountability for egregious human rights abuses”).
145. Id. at 195.
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addresses these concerns. It allows the courts to adjudicate cases
based on a clear legal standard and precludes the Administration
from using its position to stop the litigation of cases it simply does not
like.
CONCLUSION
As ATS litigation expands and cases are filed throughout the
country, American jurisprudence, as it has so many times in our
history, calls for uniformity. The potential for abuse of both
executive power and plaintiff power demand a definite standard
courts can use in addressing executive deference. Such a standard
would allow the judiciary to balance the need for justice in individual
cases with the specific and foreseeable concerns of the Executive. It
adds transparency to the decision-making process which benefits both
the domestic and international players in ATS disputes. Finally, it
upholds our system of separation of powers in the face of two
compelling and competing forces: international diplomacy on the one
hand and domestic jurisprudence on the other.

